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INTRODUCTION
The prevailing view in our courts and, to some degree, in legal
scholarship is that "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather
than positive liberties."' With this absolute statement, judges have
dismissed any claim that citizens have any positive rights to govern-
ment services; that is, any claim that the federal government has an
affirmative duty to ensure that its citizens can actually enjoy their
constitutional liberties. The Supreme Court has denied claim after
claim for government services, including the right to decent hous-
ing, public education,' medical care,5 and welfare assistance.6 Finally,
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,7 the Su-
preme Court held that a social service agency could not be liable for
failing to remove a child from the custody of his father, despite sub-
stantial evidence of the father's violent tendencies.' The DeShaney
opinion went even further, however, declaring that the Due Process
Clause did not impose any affirmative obligations on state govern-
ment." DeShaney thus became the latest-and perhaps the Court's
J.D. Candidate, 2001, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
2 Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner,J.).
Positive rights are defined as rights to government action. Susan Bandes, The Negative Con-stitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2272 (1990). When a citizen enforces a positive
right, she can compel the government to take action to provide certain services. By contrast,
negative rights entail freedom from government action. Id. To enforce a negative right, a citi-
zen merely insists that the government not act so as to impinge her freedom.
See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (denying a fundamental right to housing).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (denying a funda-
mental right to education).
See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (rejecting a claim for equal Medicaid fund-
ing for both childbirth and abortion by declaring that the government has no obligation to
provide any medical funding at all).
6 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478-83 (1970) (denying a fundamental right to
minimal subsistence).
489 U.S. 189 (1989) (finding no liability under the Due Process Clause for a social service
agency's decision to return a child to his father, a suspected child abuser, who inflicted severe
injuries upon the child.)
SId.
See id. at 195 (denying that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates
an affirmative right to protection).
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strongest-statement sanctioning the negative rights theory"' as the
official guiding principle by which demands for government action
will be measured.
Whether the negative rights view prevails in our political culture
or in society at large is a different question, one largely independent
of the Court's reasoning. Claims to positive rights can take various
forms, ranging from broad social rights, such as the right to mini-
mum subsistence," to those dependent on more narrowly defined
governmental duties, like Joshua DeShaney's claim to be protected
from his father's abuse.'- Additionally, what is a "positive" or a "nega-
tive" right depends on how one defines the issue at stake: While a
majority on the Court framedJoshua's claim for relief as relying on a
(nonexistent) right to government protection, s another reading of
the facts would suggest that Joshua's claim was that the government
agency assigned to protect him should merely conduct its business in
a non-negligent manner.'4  However, there is a general understand-
ing among Americans that the police and other state actors have a
duty to protect private citizens from danger.' Another telling indica-
tor is the evolution of a duty to rescue in tort law, despite the long-
standing common law rule that denies any liability for nonfeasance.
Also, the fact that a community, a state, or the country as a whole has
chosen (through its elected representatives) to provide certain social
services gives strong normative support for an individual's claim to
receive those services.7 Apparently, the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction that lawyers and judges take for granted does not match
the average person's moral intuitions.
Furthermore, as a theory of constitutional interpretation, the
negative rights view is far from universally accepted. Legal scholar-
01 will. use the term "negative rights view" to describe the theory that the Constitution con-
tains only guarantees of negative rights. The "positive rights view" interprets the Constitution as
requiring the government to affirmatively act in some circumstances.
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum ti-
tlements, 44 MERCERL REv. 525 (1993) (arguing that there is a constitutional right to basic sub-
sistence).
12 See Steven J. Heyman, The irst Duty of Gotwnm rt: Prutkdion, Liberty and the Farurternth
Amendment, 41 DuKE LJ. 507, 509 (1991) (arguing that the state has a duty under tie Four-
teenth Amendment to protect an abused child).
is DeShaneg, 489 U.S. at 195.
14"Tihe question [involved in DeShaney] does not turn on the imposition of a ncv duty.
Rather, the case involved a state's failure to carry out promises it had already made to protect
helpless victims."Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Failure and Local Demmrat: The Plities of De-
Shaney, 1990 DuKE U. 1078, 1096.
15 "Imagine, for example, the public reaction if a state decriminalized child and spouse
abuse on the grounds that such abuse constitutes a private family matter." Id. at 1087. Steven
Heyman's excellent, thoroughly researched article traces tie historical pedigree of the govern-
ment's duty to protect. This duty has been a fundamental principle of our legal system and cu l-
ture from the English common law, through the Revolution, the Civil War, and the Reconstruc-
tion. See Heyman, supra note 12.
16 For a more detailed discussion of affirmative duties in ton law, see infra Part 11.
17 Beerman, supra note 14, at 1094.
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ship reveals a wide diversity of opinions on this issue. Before De-
Shaney, many state courts and federal district courts had developed
doctrines expanding the affirmative duties of government.' The de-
bate continues today in the scholarly literature as well as in federal
and state courts around the country.
The thesis of this Comment is that interpretations of the Constitu-
tion that recognize some degree of positive rights are equally as plau-
sible and legitimate as a strict negative rights view, if not more so.
The dominant mainstream theories allow for positive rights claims,
and explicitly endorse certain affirmative duties. The advocates of
both the positive and negative rights views draw from overlapping
theoretical sources, especially deontology and consequentialism, that
lie at the heart of mainstream political thought. These theories are
important to understanding legal development because they form the
bedrock principles by which arguments and beliefs about the law are
justified. As such, these theories are both indicators of and shaping
forces within the social and legal culture. An examination of how
these theories treat positive rights, as well as how other areas of law
have evolved to incorporate positive rights, will show that positive
rights have deep roots in our political and legal culture. At the same
time, an examination of DeShaney's effects on constitutional law
makes clear that the negative rights regime has deformed the devel-
opment of the law and has led judges to rely on formalistic logic
games rather than real principles ofjustice.
Part I will describe the theoretical foundations of both the nega-
tive and positive rights views. Both sides can claim support from
mainstream political thought, as well as from the text and history of
the Constitution. A strict negative/positive rights distinction is a false
reading of our system's common law past that has remained in place
even after the common law has begun to evolve away from such a hol-
low distinction.
Part II discusses how the lower courts have dealt with positive
rights claims. Courts across the country have begun developing and
expanding exceptions to the strict "no liability for nonfeasance" rule
in the law of torts.20 These developments, plus the exceptions these
courts have carved out of DeShaney, indicate that other courts view the
conventional wisdom as an unduly harsh rule in need of qualifica-
tion.2' Trial courts and local appeals courts deal with the people
harmed by government neglect or inaction. These courts' reactions
to DeShaney, and their attempts to follow that case's holding, indicate
18 See discussion infra Part II.
9 See David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a Negative
Citizenship"Regime, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 3 (1996) ("[Law, being located at the intersection
of civil society and the state, combines the persuasive norms of the former with the coercive
power of the latter.")
20 See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
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which theoretical and practical problems actually do arise in concrete
cases. Some courts have developed exceptions to DeShaney that man-
age to realize our ideas of justice while still ostensibly staying within
DeShaney's rule;2 in contrast, cases denying relief under DeShaney illus-
trate the moral and logcal distortion 'wrought by DeShaney's broad
negative rights holding. Outside of federal constitutional law, state
courts' interpretations of positive rights guarantees found in state
constitutions, plus other statutory guarantees of public or private as-
sistance, indicate that there is indeed room within America's political
culture for some claims of positive rights.
Part III summarizes the practical or policy-based arguments ad-
vanced by negative and positive rights proponents. The negative
rights view is more a creation of expediency than of pure legal prin-
ciples;24 thus, many of the most convincing claims made in favor of
the negative rights theory are based on practical concerns. - Any at-
tempt to remove the negative rights roadblock will need to overcome
the practical difficulties that arise from imposing affirmative duties
on the government.-
I. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTHE PosrrnE
AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS VIEWS
The primary moral and political theories that comprise our cul-
tural set of beliefs provide a strong foundation for positive rights in
the law. Conventional morality is a mixture of consequentialism and
deontology;- similarly, elements of both libertarian and communi-
tarian political thought are present in American political culture, al-
though they are mutually antagonistic."' An examination of these
four dominant theories in American political and legal culture shows
that positive rights are a natural part of that culture.
A. Deontological or Rights-Based Theories
Deontology is defined by a belief "in the existence of constraints,
which erect moral barriers to the promotion of the good."2 Those
constraints are usually discussed as our rights as human beings; these
See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
*4 See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
_6 See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
_7 SeeSHELLYKAGAN, NORMATIvE ETHICS 74-78 (1998) (arguing that conventional morality is
notpurely consequentialist, but includes a deontological component).
See Sanford Levinson, The lWfare State, in A COXMINION TO PHILOSO'HY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 553, 553-54 (Dennis Patterson ed. 1996) (observing that almost every Western
government, including the United States, is some kind of welfare state; none are purely libertar-
ian "night-wvatchman" states).
KAGAN, supra note 27, at 73.
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rights preserve each individual's inherent dignity and worth as an"end in himself.''3° Deontological rights take priority over the com-
parative goodness of the results of a given act; thus, unlike conse-
quentialism, deontological theories do not allow rights to be com-
promised to achieve a quantitatively "better" result.31  Certain key
features of deontological theory are prevalent in discussions of posi-
tive and negative rights, most notably: the affirmative act require-
ment, the moral significance of intent, and the distinction between
obligatory and permissive moral acts.
1. The Action/Inaction Distinction
The negative rights view relies heavily on the deontological prem-
ise that only actions, not omissions, have moral worth. The re-
quirement of an affirmative act-outside of certain carefully limited
exceptions-is a basic requirement for liability under tort law and
criminal law. This rule is present in almost every such case in the
form of strict causation requirements: "If personal losses are attrib-
utable to third parties or natural events, it follows that the party who
suffered the loss has no claim on the government. No causal linkage
exists .... 33
Negative rights proponents apply this idea in interpreting the
Constitution as containing only negative rights. The Constitution
does not merely delineate the government's political powers and
limitations; it also declares the government's ethical obligation not to
interfere with its citizens' rights. From a deontological standpoint,
this duty extends only to government actions: Government inaction,
even in the face of extreme injury or indifference by state actors, is
not a morally culpable deprivation of liberty by the government."
Despite the negative rights view's selective use of the ac-
tion/inaction distinction, even deontological theories based on a
so See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Uncontitutional Conditions,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1251 & n.246 (1990) (discussing Kantian moral theory in basic con-
stitutional values). But cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of GoverniIntd,
27 GA. L. REV. 343, 351 (1993) (noting that such metaphysical theories are useful in explaining
why people should have rights, but are inadequate to specify exactly what the content of those
rights should be).
See ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 625, 638 (Joel
Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000) (comparing utilitarianism and deontology);
ROGERJ. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 50 (1989) (explaining Kant's theory that
moral obligations are absolute); KAGAN, supra note 27, at 73-74 (defining deontology and con-
sequentiaism).-- i" See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2313 (quoting Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YAi
L.J. 1135,1142 (1989)).3 Richard A. Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for Welfare Rights, 1985 BYU L. REV. 201, 226
(1985).
See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 86'i, 864
(1986) (pointing out that American jurisprudence generally recognizes no liability for govern-
ment inaction).
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constraint against doing harm do place some (albeit lesser) moral
weight on allowing harm.st Additionally, most deontological theorists
explicitly recognize some specific affirmative duties. For example,
Kant discussed positive obligations such as the duty to develop one's
talents or to love one's parents.s Even in our legal system of pre-
dominantly negative rights, the state can still enforce a parent's duty
to care for his children, and most people consider it both a moral
failing and a legal crime when a parent refuses to fulfill this obliga-
tion.
2. Intent
Perhaps the strongest rebuttal of the negative rights view's reli-
ance on the action/inaction distinction is the fact that only one strain
of deontological theory attaches moral weight to results alone; more
familiar is the school of thought that judges morality by the actor's
intent.3 7 Liability (except for limited instances of strict liability) at-
taches to actions not solely based on their physical effects, but rather
because an act is more completely understood to be an "external
manifestation of the will, "s i.e., intent; otherwise, we could hold peo-
ple criminally liable for innocently (non-negligently) causing acci-
dents. Under this view, then, inaction can be just as wrongful as ac-
tion if done with wrongful intent.0 When the government withholds
the assistance needed to exercise a fundamental right, say in the case
of Medicaid funding for abortion, the government makes a conscious
decision not to protect that right from the vicissitudes of the market,
thereby causall bringing about a prohibited goal through seemingly
passive means.
3. The Distinction Between Obligatory and Supererogatoiy Duties
The negative rights view also rests upon the distinction between
obligatory and supererogatory duties. Kant distinguished "narrow"
is See KAGAN, supra note 27, at 95 rThe suggestion is not being made that the deontologist
thinks it morally unimportant if, in a given case, you have allowed harm. If there is some hamt
that you could have prevented, and you fail to do it, then this weights heavily against the moral
permissibility of your act.... All other things being equal, your act is still forbidden.*).
56 SuLIvAN, supra note 31, at 52-53.
!Eg., KAGAN, supra note 27, at 102-05; SuuivAN, sup-a note 31 at 66.
n See Weinrib, supra note 31, at 641 n.24 (defining the term "act" as it is used in the tort
law .
See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2280-81 (describing how a more complete legal definition of
the word "act" includes an intent element); Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Le%is Wells, Gotn-
mental naction, as a Constitutional Tord: DeShaney and its Afterrnath, 66 WASH. L RE.V. 107, 162-63
(1991) (advocating a "deliberate indifference" standard for evaluating state actors' conduct).
40 See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2299-301 (discussing how the penalty/subsidy distinction em-
ployed by the Court in Harris, Maher, and Webster diverts attention from the fact that the gov-
emment's intent clearly was to burden the exercise of abortion rights).
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duties, which were primarily restraints on conduct, from "wide" du-
ties that obligate a person to act affirmatively in some way." Narrow
duties are required of every person regardless of circumstances, while
wide or positive duties do not specify how or to what extent an indi-
vidual must act to fulfill them; therefore, each individual must use his
judgment in deciding how and to what extent to fulfill a positive
duty.42 In a sense, the fact that positive duties are merely permissible
makes them morally neutral-an individual or a government can be
praised for carrying out such obligations, but neither can be faulted
for neglecting to do so.
Translated into legal terms, this concept makes a sharp distinction
between legal and imperfect obligations. Legal obligations, including
rights, are enforceable by government, but imperfect obligations are
more akin to charity-they do not require anyone, either the gov-
ernment or private citizens, to fulfill them, nor can needy persons
claim a right to that assistance.4 Judge Posner's Seventh Circuit opin-
ion in DeShaney takes this distinction for granted: "The men who
framed the original Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
were worried about government's oppressing the citizenry rather
than about its failing to provide adequate social services. ""
Negative rights theorists recognize that many people will not be
able to enjoy their constitutional rights, whether because their pov-
erty makes such rights unaffordable, or because their youth or other
circumstances render them vulnerable to private violence.47 How-
ever, this view argues that, because the government played no active
part in creating these problems, it has no obligation to correct them.
The consequentialist strain of the negative rights view does not neces-
sarily foreclose legislative action to create social services, but these
services are seen as privileges, not rights that citizens can enforce in
court.
48
41 SULLIVAN, supra note 31, at 51-52.
42 Id. at 52.
43 Id. at 189.
See Epstein, supra note 33, at 204 (describing the distinction between legal and imperfect
obligations as rooted in the common lav).
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987)
(quoted in Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free Workl" of DeShaney, 57 CEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1512, 1521-22 (1989)).
46 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the government has no obligation
to fund medically necessary abortions).
47 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (refusing to
hold state child protection agency liable for mistakenly returning a child to an abusive home).
48 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 ("[The Fourteenth Amendment's] purpose was to protect
the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other. The
Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the
democratic political processes."). See also Currie, supra note 34, at 886-87 (arguing that, while
explicit constitutional foundations for positive rights are lacking, the Constitution does not rule
out legislative action that would create such rights).
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To the extent that deontological theories contrast narrow (nega-
tive) duties to wide (positive) duties, the conclusion does not follow
that, because positive duties are left to the individual's judgment,
they are unnecessary. 9 The fact that those duties leave their exact
scope of fulfillment up to the individual actor does not mean that the
actor may abandon them altogether. In fact, social or political con-
sensus may very well specify' a certain minimum extent to which those
duties should be fulfilled-for example, the government requires
that parents supply a minimum of care to their children. In the tort
context, certain (judicially crafted) limitations on a duty to rescue-
that such a duty exists only in an emergency situation, and only if the
actor can perform the rescue with little harm to his own interests-
can impose an objective standard rather than individual, subjective d e-
terminations of how to fulfill a positive duty, thereby eliminating the
risks posed by an overly expansive affirmative duty.
B. Consequentialist Theories
Consequentialist theories maintain as their core value the maxi-
mization of happiness, welfare5 , or some other version of the general
good. Modem consequentialist theories tend to follow a rule utilitar-
ian strand, viewing rights as the result of a balancing of interests be-
tween private citizens or between citizens and the government."
Judges and legislators may not re-weigh the balance whenever the oc-
casion arises, however; "[r]ules result from a balance of interests, but,
once in place, exert an independent claim to obedience. " "
The rule-of-law argument implicit in rule utilitarianism, as well as
some consideration of state interests, are present in much of the
negative-rights rhetoric. In favor of government interests, negative
rights proponents claim that judicial recognition of positive rights
would divert resources from other programs and subvert legislative
discretion regarding spending priorities.v Also, conservatives decry
49 See SuLuVAN, supra note 31, at 316 n.16 (discussing various interpretations of supereroga-
ti°''SeeWeinrib, supra note 31, at 636-37 ("'The relief of an emergency is... unlikely to induce
reliance on the assistance of others in normal conditions:).
51 Utilitarians such asJohn Stuart Mill andJeremy Bentham based their utilitarian theory on
happiness as its core value. By contrast, "welfarists" distinguish "welfare" from "happiness" in
that while the latter describes the satisfaction of desires, the former is a more comprehensive
term, connoting the overall life satisfaction of an "informed and autonomous subject." LW.
SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 172 (1996).
52 See Fallon, supra note 30, at 347-48 (positing that individual rights are essentially limits on
government power, or the result of a balancing between individual and government interests).
. Id. at 375.
See Epstein, supra note 33, at 206-07 (arguing that treating welfare as a right would fail to
take into account the limited resources available to satisfy this right).
SeeEaton & Wels, supra note 39, at 128-29 (explaining the argumnent that legislatures. not
the judiciary, should decide how to allocate resources and define the government's obliga-
tions).
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judges' "invention" of new fundamental rights through creative in-
terpretations of the law.
56
An additional consequentialist feature present in the negative
rights view is that both theories judge the rightness of actions by their
effects or results, not by the actor's intent. The negative rights doc-
trine ignores the state's intent when it fails to act: As the Court held
in DeShaney, the government can only be held liable when it makes a
victim worse off, regardless of the state actor's intentions.7 Although
the Court relied on several cases that included state-of-mind inquir-
ies,53 such a requirement was conspicuously absent from the major-
ity's opinion in this case. The Court's test was essentially results-
oriented: Was the state's active conduct a proximate cause of
Joshua's injuries?59 Once it had answered this question in the nega-
tive, the majority felt no need to consider whether the state actors
had been negligent or "deliberately indifferent" to Joshua's safety. °
Although the DeShaney Court relies on some consequentialist
premises, such as the basic causation issue discussed above and the
public policy concerns described in the next section, the bulk of con-
sequentialist reasoning soundly repudiates the negative rights view.
Consequentialism weighs the rightness of an action purely on its re-
sults, not on the actor's intent: "for the consequentialist... there is
no intrinsic moral significance to the distinction between doing and
allowing."6 A rule utilitarian analysis sees the action/inaction distinc-
tion as irrelevant in questions of rights: "what rights should be rec-
ognized at any particular time depends on an assessment of compet-
ing interests and likely empirical consequences .... 6' Also, any
undesired consequences arising out of the recognition of positive
rights can be mitigated by tailoring the rule to produce the best out-
come, as Professor Weinrib demonstrates in proposing a tort law duty
to rescue. 6
See Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education and the Tricks
of the Trade, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1046-47 and passim (1992) (describing the legal arguments
used by the Supreme Court to recognize unenumerated rights as "tricks of the trade").
57 SeeDeShaneyv. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) ("While
the State may have been aware of the dangers thatJoshua faced in the free world, it played no
part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them."). See
also Bandes, supra note 2, at 2278 (criticizing the action/inaction distinction).
58 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198 n.5 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S 97, 105-06 (1976), that
held prison officials liable for "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's need for medical atten-
tion).
9 Id. at 201.
60 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 162 (describing a state-of-mind inquiry as essential to
protect people from "abusive or oppressive behavior on the part of government officers").
r] KAGAN, supra note 27, at 95. See Weinrib, supra note 31, at 635 ("Consequences are im-
portant; how they are reached is not.").
62 Fallon, supra note 30, at 378-79.
63 See Weinrib, supra note 31, at 636-38 (discussing two limitations on a duty to rescue: that
the duty arise only in emergencies, and that the rescuer can assist the victim with little harm or
inconvenience to himself).
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Additionally, positive rights advocates point out that, in opinions
like DeShaney and Webster, the Court has selected an inappropriate
and unrealistic baseline for considering whether an individual is
made worse off by government inaction. These cases compare in-
stances of inadequate state action against a hypothetical state in
which the government provides no services whatsoever. However, we
live in a modern welfare state in which government ields so much
power over access to resources that it can do harm by virtue of its in-
ertia, by inaction or inadequate action, and by holding a monopoly
on certain kinds of aid and displacing private sources of help."' The
state has also shaped the social structures that enable man) constitu-
tional torts to occur. In Joshua DeShaney's case, Wisconsin's family
law gave custody of the boy to his father, this wrasjust as much a form
of positive state action as if the state had placed Joshua in an abusive
foster home.65
Furthermore, rights cannot be understood separately from the
powers of government; a consequentialist theory of rights requires
that the interests of individuals and the government be balanced
against the interests of private citizens.66 At the very least, a utilitarian
cost-benefit analysis mandates a duty to rescue if the benefits to the
people involved are less than the costs to the government.
C. Libertarianism
Libertarianism places overriding importance on individual auton-
omy. This ideology maintains that individual freedom and self-
sufficiency must be respected in order to preserve human dignity and
prevent state oppression.67 The government thus should remove only
structural or artificial barriers that prevent people from exercising
their rights. Further, to intervene in order to correct "natural" ine-
qualities would degrade the people so helped because such action
would deprive them of the virtues of self-help and treat them as less
than autonomous, adult human beings.s Additionally, most liber-
tarians accept the presumption that inequalities are primarily the re-
sult of individual choice rather than of social factors outside an indi-
vidual's control. Therefore, they believe that any claim of positive
64 See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2283-85 (describing the ways in which governmental inaction
can have the same negative effects as deliberate action).
65 Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slanvry: A Thirtn7th Alre, udmt-f Re-
sponse to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L REv. 1359, 1362 (1992) ([Llike property, custody is a legal
concept, shaped and enforced by the state.").
See Fallon, supra note 30, at 360 and passim.
SeeSoifer, supra note 45, at 1519-20 (criticizing the majority's reasoning in DTiShan. 'Be-
cause no government had locked up Joshua, he ought to have taken care of himself. That is
what individuals, rugged or not, are expected to do in the free world.").
0 See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2316-17 (explaining the view that portrays the results of free
competition as just, but government interference as degrading and intrusive on individual lib-
erty).
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liberty amounts to the government's attempting to remove self-
imposed constraints on liberty, in effect paternalistically determining
the substantive content of that liberty and overriding those individu-
als' decisions about their own best interests.69
The libertarian's disdain for social legislation in general generates
antipathy toward any claims of positive rights to government services.
Libertarians worry that positive rights would require massive-ulti-
mately wasteful-public expenditures. In addition to helping people
who are less at fault for their own condition, the government might
be forced to take on the care of individuals whose self-destructive be-
havior is the main cause of their problems. 70 They also express con-
cern that a broad declaration of positive rights would force states to
implement expensive outreach programs in order to meet judicially
created standards.7 ' Furthermore, because libertarians do not con-
sider social services to be part of the government's proper function,
any state-run program that attempts to fulfill these imperfect obliga-
tions is guilty of stealing from the taxpayers to give to the poor: "It is
a different matter when some people try to fund their gifts with cash
taken from their neighbor's pockets."
Despite their strong denouncements of government in general-
and social programs in particular-even libertarians must admit that
the state exists in part to protect individuals from each other.3 Some
scholars have even reconciled certain redistributive goals with liber-
tarian individualism: For instance, some commentators limit the
right to amass resources when exclusion of others causes severe harm
71or death. Most modern libertarians include the provision of some
public goods within the state's proper range of powers or responsi-
bilities.
Furthermore, critics of the negative rights view point out that this
doctrine in effect frustrates the very rights that libertarians wish to
protect. Even libertarians must recognize that individual rights are
nonexistent if they cannot be exercised, or if the state does not en-
force those rights that are necessary for a free and democratic gov-
ernment.76 Certain minimum levels of physical integrity are "a pre-
69 See id. at 2325 (explaining how the action/inaction distinction relates to ideas about posi-
tive versus negative liberty).
70 See Dennis D. Donn, Utopian Dangers: Cherminisky's "Right to Minimum Subsistence", ,114
MERCER L. REV. 553, 560 (1993) (questioning the manageability of positive rights).
71 id.
7 Epstein, supra note 33, at 203.
73 See Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged
Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599,663-64 (1992) (discussing libertarian theory in the
context of a right to minimal subsistence).
74 See id. at 664 ("[S]ome libertarians [concede] that, for example, one may not appropriate
the only water hole in the desert to the life-threatening exclusion or the extortion of others.").
75 Levinson, supra note 28, at 553.
76 See Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution? 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1233, 1243 (1995) ("[G]enuine representative democracy involves widespread
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condition to the accomplishment of the purposes that [a person's]
freedom gives him the power to set."" Scholars on both sides of this
debate recognize that, to a great extent, some minimal level of physi-
cal and material security is necessary for an individual to be freei.
This view argues that constitutional rights should not be dependent
on a person's ability to pay for them, and therefore the government
has an obligation to help needy citizens exercise those rights.I Social
rights should be enshrined in the Constitution because, as the found-
ing charter of our nation and a repository for rights that are set be-
yond the reach of legislative majorities, the Constitution should con-
tain all of the most important aspirations and principles of our
society.8s
Moreover, some libertarian policy premises lack firm empirical
support. Legal realists have long criticized the libertarian's sharp dis-
tinction between public and private activity as fictitious; in reality, the
"private" sphere has been shaped and enabled by government ac-
tion.81 The claim that inequality is entirely self-generated is belied by
the existence of a hereditary, marginalized, socially immobilized un-
derclass in this country, whose poverty and powerlessness are in part
maintained by institutionalized inequalities in education and by racial
discrimination.2 In addition, the libertarian's image of the "rugged
individual" capable of fending for himself or herself certainly does
not hold true in cases involving children in need of protection, This
extremely atomistic picture of humanity has been criticized by some
scholars-most notably communitarians-for inaccurately brushing
aside the complex interactions and interdependencies between indi-
viduals and their societies, not to mention each individual's nature as
a social being.84
participation, as well as tolerance and compromise. Destitute, hungry people don't vote, and
idle, hungry people have no patience for the slow, often tedious haggling among often sharply
differing groups that democracy requires.").
See Weinrib, supra note 31, at 638.
SeeAbraharn, supra note 19, at 32 ('[N]egative rights. 'liberties', provide people with pos-
sibilities that in our existing socioeconomic system they are unable to fulfill meaningfully'); i.
at 47-48 (discussing the notion of property, or a minimal level of material security, as te
"guardian" of other rights).
9 SeeMarkTushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the lreestruaian AynendrritLo
25 LOY. L.A. L REV. 1207, 1214-16 (1992) (dmwing a distinction between fomal rights-r
rights that require only that the laws be in harmony with them-and rights that are more con-
cerned with social realities or effects).
so See iU. at 1210 (describing the unique status of constitutional rights in political culture):
Helen Hershkoff, UWfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FoRDt.uI L RLv 1403, 1429
(1999) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Wefare Devolution].
s1 Levinson, supra note 28, at 556-57.
SeeJudges, supra note 73, at 662 ('Extreme poverty and deprivation of basic education
inflict... harms... because they disable any real participation in politics and plainly do ascribe
social and political stigma.").
83 Soifer, supra note 45, at 1519-20.
See; eg., id. at 1520 (criticizing the atomistic .iew of humanity): ALA. GEWIRTUI, THE
COM.MUNIYOFRIGHTS 32 (1996) (noting the disagreement between "liberal individualists" and
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D. Communitarian Theories
One commentator described communitarianism as "the sane
middle ground... between authoritarianism and libertarianism.""
The basic characteristic of communitarian theories is that they envi-
sion individuals and their community as mutually interdependent
rather than antagonistic. 6 In contrast, the atomistic model of human
rights embodied in libertarianism sees society or government as con-
flicting with the rights and interests of the individual.8 7 "Communi-
tarians support basic civil liberties, but fear that our ability to con-
front societal problems effectively is compromised by the claims of
'radical individualists' who would subordinate the needs of the com-
munity to the absolute fulfillment of individual rights."'
Positive rights are a fundamental part of communitarian theory.
These rights or obligations are necessary to fulfill the core values of
communitarianism: freedom, equality, and well-being. Addition-
ally, the inclusion of positive rights is essential for the communi-
tarian's conception of human beings as social rather than atomistic:
"When rights are viewed solely as negative, in that their correlative
duties require only noninterference with persons' having the objects
of their rights, the adversarial conception of the relation between
rights and community is given ready entry.""
Many scholars have recognized collective aspects to our Constitu-
tion's supposedly individualistic, negative rights. Professor Tribe has
observed that the positive rights expressly described in the Constitu-
tion do not fit the standard description of rights under our system.9'
For example, the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of a speedy trial,
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and the right to counsel,
and the requirement of Article IV, section 4 that the United States
guarantee a republican form of government, impose affirmative re-
quirements on the federal government. While the Bill of Rights typi-
cally describes rights that are individual, alienable, and negative,
these other rights are just the opposite. First, they are positive, in
that they require some affirmative act by the government to fulfill
them. Second, they are inalienable, as no individual may perma-
nently waive these rights. Third, they are held in common by all citi-
communitarians).
85 Robert M. Ackerman, Ton Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30
WAKE FoREST L. REv. 649, 650 (1995).
86 GEWIRTH, supra note 84, at 2.
87 Id.
83 Ackerman, supra note 85, at 650 (internal citations omitted).
89 Gewirth, supra note 84, at 31.
90 Id.
91 Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties,
and the Dilemma of Dependence 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 332-33 (1985).
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zens, and cannot be asserted by one individual (except, of course, the
Sixth Amendment's rights protecting criminal defendants). Tribe
observes that these rights "correspond to systemic norms-norms
concerned with structuring power relationships to avoid the creation
or perpetuation of hierarchy .... " Thus, even rights that are com-
monly regarded as attaching to individuals derive their substance and
meaning from an individual's membership in a group.
In addition, even the commonly accepted negative Constitutional
rights define "spheres of membership" by singling out some people
for protection based on characteristics shared in common ith a93
group. For example, when a person invokes the Americans ith
Disability Act, she must prove that her claimed disability is of the type
protected under the Act2L
In a system of group-centered or relational rights, government
can effect great harm by its inaction. When the state refuses to pro-
tect or assist an individual in exercising a positive right-for instance,
by refusing to fund abortions for poor women-that refusal amounts
to a forced alienation of that right.95 Also, the modem welfare state
creates reliance on its services and displaces private sources of help."
The greater influence the government has on our society, the greater
responsibility the government should take in alleviating social prob-
lems. Extensive government involvement in shaping our society
makes the claim of nonfeasance less tenable-the government's con-
duct is active misfeasance when it has played a part in the creation or
exacerbation of a social problem in the private sphere. Despite liber-
tarian criticism of social services, they have become a fact of modem
life: "Just as we no longer trust our economic welfare to the uncer-
tainties of the unregulated marketplace, we no longer trust our per-
sonal welfare to the uncertainties of the weakened family struc-
ture ....
Communitarian ideals are important because many legal reform-
ers speak in the language of communal values and mutual support, as
well as because communitarianism engages traditional liberal values
in a constructive dialogue that will most likely continue to reshape
9.Id.
93 See EricJ. Mimick, Taking Righus Spherically: Formal and Colcaiveste ts of Legal Righs. 34
WAKE FoREsr L RE%. 409, 434 (1999) (discussing how, when an individual asserts a right, he
must prove that his circumstances are substantially similar to those of the group described by
that right).
9 Id.
SeeTribe, supra note 91, at 336 (discussing the abortion funding cases).
96 See Beerman, supra note 14, at 1089-90 ("All institutions ... structure themselves in re-
sponse to the institutions that surround them. As government agencies become more pervasive
and more powerful, the ethical argument in favor of a governmental responsibility to intervene
becomes stronger Other institutions develop around those agencies, and people rely on the
agencies for the protective services they provide.").
SId. at 1092.
93 Id. at 1093.
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the way we view the law.99 In addition, due to this theory's strong em-
phasis on mutual obligations, communitarianism is one major theo-
retical school that is effectively closed out of the law by the DeShaney
Court's negative rights rule.
II. THE EVOLUTION AND AVOIDANCE OF POSITIVE RIGHTS:
DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER DESHANEY
The artificial exclusion of positive rights from constitutional law
has distorted the development of the law. This distortion is evident
not only in the questionable logic of DeShaney itself,'° but also in the
refusal of lower courts to apply the DeShaney exceptions, as well as the
distortion of state constitutional law affected by the gravitational pull
of federal constitutional doctrine. At the same time, however, some
positive rights notions have developed and continue to evolve. These
include the judicially crafted exceptions to DeShaney, notions of af-
firmative duties in private law, and the presence of explicit positive
rights guarantees in state constitutional law.
On the one hand, some courts have developed exceptions to De-
Shaney that recognize some limited affirmative duties on behalf of
government. By contrast, other courts have refused to apply those
exceptions, extending DeShaney past its own terms to foreclose a vic-
tim's recovery even in cases where the state can be said to have an ac-
tive causal role (in the traditional sense) in the ultimate harm. These
cases highlight the distortion in the law caused by DeShaney.
Private law has shown an increasing acceptance of affirmative du-
ties of private citizens toward other citizens. These developments
show, first, that the negative rights view is not applied uniformly
throughout all areas of the law. Second, they show that the moral
foundations for some positive rights (or affirmative duties) are strong
enough to have led courts and legislatures to craft exceptions to the
general rule of "no liability for nonfeasance."'0 ' Third, the particular
types of rules that impose affirmative duties can serve as guideposts
for expanding positive rights in constitutional law, as these rules al-
ready enjoy popular support.
State constitutional law contains even broader guarantees of posi-
tive rights, which shows that these rights are already an established
part of our political culture. However, state courts have erroneously
imitated the negative rights rule in federal constitutional law, which
has distorted and weakened many state constitutional rights.' °
99 See Abraham, supra note 19, at 5-6 (discussing the dialogue between communitarian and
liberal theories and the role of communitarian ideas in legal reform).
100 For a more detailed criticism of the DeShaney decision, see generally Bandes, supra note 2.101 SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 314(A) cmt. c (1965).
102 See generally, Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1153-69 (1999) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive
Rights].
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A. Changing Views about Affirmative Duties
Positive rights are not foreign to this country's legal history; in
fact, they have found expression in state law as well as in federal law.
Through the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the federal constitution
originally left the protection of most civil rights, including positive
rights, to the states.0 3 Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted with the explicit intention of requiring the government to
protect citizens' rights. In its interpretation of the Due Process
Clause, the DeShaney Court confused the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment with that of the Fifth. The Fifth Amendment %-as based
in its framers' fear of tyranny by the federal government; this is the
rhetoric that the DeShaney majority uses to describe the policies and
intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.'
However, the Fourteenth Amendment and its family of Reconstruc-
tion legislation arose out of a concern for deliberate state inaction.
One of the major ills that plagued the post-war South was the ram-
pant terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, which was exacerbated or even
facilitated by local officials' refusal to act to oppose it. Section 1983,
passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, was meant to rem-
edy this problem by creating a cause of action against this kind of
abuse of official power.1
0 5
Although the law does not enforce every moral requirement, most
legal rules are based in a common understanding of morality.'
Popular sentiment about which moral duties are required, and which
should be encapsulated within the law, indicates where the moral
ground is fertile for the growth of law. The general consensus is that
affirmative duties should be imposed, and victims should be given a
positive-rights remedy in court, for certain common-law and constitu-
tional torts.
The area of the law in which this view has most readily found legal
expression is in the tort law. Although the common law of torts has
traditionally maintained a strict separation between misfeasance and
nonfeasance,07 the law has gradually evolved some exceptions to the
no-duty default rule that are now widely accepted. The Second Re-
statement of Torts recognizes affirmative duties to others in the fol-
lowing circumstances: special relationships, ' Ot a duty to prevent fur-
10 U.S. CoNSr. amend. IX & X.
104 SeeEaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 118-21 (discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Desharn'); Soifer, supra note 45, at 1521-26 (comparing the
intent behind the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.)
103 See id.
106 SeeAckerman, supra note 85, at 661 (discussing the interrekation of law and morality).
107 SeeRE rATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 314(A) crn. c (1965).
10 Id. § 314(A).
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ther harm after causally contributing to an initial injury," a duty to
warn or protect after one's actions create an unreasonable risk of
harm, "0 and the duty to follow through on an attempted rescue and
to act with due care."'
Additionally, state law reflects a growing recognition of a duty on
behalf of private citizens to rescue another person in danger, or-at
the very least-the law provides an incentive to rescue. Some states
have passed statutes requiring an individual to assist someone in peril
when the danger is great and the rescuer can complete the rescue
with minimal danger or inconvenience to himself, Several more
states have laws that punish those who fail to report serious crimes.",
Also noteworthy is the fact that all fifty states have "Good Samaritan"
laws intended to encourage (rather than sway by threat of criminal
sanction or lawsuit) people to attempt a rescue or to give medical
aid."' These laws absolve rescuers from legal or criminal liability ex-
cept where the rescuer recklessly or intentionally harms the victim.
The exceptions within the tort law indicate that the law no longer
refuses to impose affirmative obligations on citizens to look out for
the welfare of others. These laws consciously amend the preexisting
legal structure in favor of a more communitarian-influenced ap-
proach, which shows that people generally believed something was
previously lacking from the traditional understanding of the law's
role and values.
B. Lower Courts'Reactions to DeShaney
In the years following DeShaney, many lower courts interpreted the
decision as a sweeping denial of almost all claims requiring affirma-
tive government action.' However, in the twelve years since that de-
Id. § 322.
Id. § 321.
m Id. § 324.
2 12 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 519 (1973), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2000); R.I. GEN.
LAWs § 11-56-1 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2) (West 1996). At least one court has held
that a state duty-to-rescue law creates by analogy a cause of action against a state agency for its
failure to follow through on an investigation of child abuse. Sabia v. State, 669 A.2d 1187, 1194-
95 (Vt. 1995).
1 See R.I. GEN. LAAWs § 11-373.1 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2) (West 1996); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.027 (West 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-115 (1986); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 268, §
40 (Law. Co-op. 1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (Anderson 1999); WASI-. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.69.100, 9.92.020 (West 1988). See also Ackerman, supra note 85, at 660 n.53 (dis-
cussing affirmative duties in state law).
See Willard v. City of Vicksburg, 571 So. 2d 972, 974 (Miss. 1990) (listing of relevant state
laws.,2 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 166 (describing lower court cases shortly after De-
Shaney that treated the decision "as a blanket prohibition on constitutional tort liability for gov-
ernment inaction"). See generallyJoseph M. Pellicciotti, Annotation, "State-Created Danger, " or
Similar Theo), as Basis for Civil Rights Action Under 42 U.S.C.S. s 1983, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 37 (2000)
(summarizing lower court cases that have denied recovery under a strict reading of DeShanty).
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cision was handed down, man) qualifications and exceptions have
germinated in the case law. Often mirroring the special rules for af-
firmative duties in the tort law, the exceptions to the no-duty rule
generally conform to the basic reasoning of DeShani.
1. Special Relationships Creating a Duty to Aid
Before DeShaney, some lower courts had developed a rule allowing
for affirmative duties when a special relationship was found to exist
between the plaintiff and the state actor(s)." t  Relying on Estelle v.
Gamble"1 and Youngberg v. Romeo,"8 DeShane, specifically limited this
exception to cases in which the victim is in the state's custody." 9
Since DeShaney, some circuits have relaxed the special relationship
rule to include situations analogous to custody, such as foster care ar-
ranged by the state or reckless placement of a child with an abusive
parent. Foster care cases have declared the broadest assertions of
positive rights for children over whose fates the government has cho-
sen to assume control. In such cases, courts often speak in terms of a
foster child's right to be placed in a safe environment'
Furthermore, some courts have held state agencies liable for plac-
ing children with their abusive natural parents. 2' These cases typi-
cally require a high standard of misconduct as judged by a state-of-
mind inquiry, namely a "deliberate indifference "' or actual knowl-
edgems standard.
These cases contrast with DeShaney in light of that case's complete
lack of any state-of-mind inquiy.' The DeShaney Court focused ex-
n6 See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2278.
12 429 U.S. 97 (1982) (holding prison officials liable for failure to provide medical care to
inmate).
11 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (requiring state to provide for tie safety and basic needs of involun-
tarily committed mental patients).
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989).
See Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a foster child has a right
to be placed with a family that will provide adequate supervision); Murphy v. Morgan. 914 F.2d
846 (7th Cir. 1990) (ruling that a state owes foster children a "rudimentary duty of safekeep-
ing"). See also Norfleet v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Ser's., 989 F.2d 2989 (8th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing the state liable for providing children in foster homes with adequate medical care): Lewis v.
New Mexico Dept. of Human Serns., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that minors in fos-
ter care have a constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm).
121 SeeJervis v. McMullen, 186 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 1999). r'hg e b:r grmatel, judgrxzt ta-
cared, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24361(8th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999) (holding that tie state created a
danger by placing a child in the custody of the father who was a convicted pedophile); Ford v.
Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 227,233 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that there is a prina facie case of state
created danger when a state agency placed a child in the custody of an abusive father). But ser
Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting in dicta that the state could not
be held liable for placing a child with an abusive natural parent).
Ford, 899 F. Supp. at 233.
Jeis, 186 F.3d at 1067.
124 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 159 (noting that DeShaney is part of a line of Supreme
Court precedents that avoid state-of-mind inquiries).
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clusively on the degree of state involvement in Joshua DeShaney's
life, seemingly indifferent to the question of whether the social work-
ers involved had actual or constructive knowledge of his father's on-
going abuse. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services had amassed
substantial evidence of abuse, and the social worker herself stated
that "'I just knew the phone would ring some day and Joshua would
be dead.', 125 Despite compelling evidence of a guilty state of mind on
the part of the state actors involved, the Court apparently considered
the officials' state of mind to be irrelevant; instead, the Court simply
declared a broad negative-rights rule and accordingly dismissed
Joshua's claim.
126
In addition, some courts have expanded the types of special rela-
tionships between victims and state defendants to include situations
in which a defendant made a promise of protection but failed to fol-
low through. Before DeShaney, some cases had found liability where
the state defendant undertook to help the plaintiff but then failed to
complete the rescue, - similar to the tort law concept of an imperfect
rescue. 128 The language of DeShaney flatly denies this argument: "the
State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's
safety by having once offered him shelter.""'- Nonetheless, some
courts have found that a government actor's failure to fulfill a prom-
ise of protection or confidentiality created a special relationship due
to the victim's reliance on that promise. For instance, several circuits
consider the state's relationship with police informants and whistle-
blowers to be sufficiently close to hold the state actors liable for
breaching a promise of confidentiality." Likewise, courts have found
that promises of confidentiality to police officers, which induced the
officers to rely on those promises, created a relationship that re-
12 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 208-09 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 300
(7th Cir. 1987)).
126 Id. at 203-04 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("It may well be ... that the Due Process Clause as
construed by our prior cases creates no general right to basic governmental services. That,
however, is not the question presented here....").
1-7 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 155 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 855 F.2d
1421 (9thCir. 1988), superseded ly901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990)).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 cmt. c (1965) (describing an actor's conduct
that furthered the victim's injury).
1:9 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
so SeeMonfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding police liable when they prom-
ised anonymity to the victim, who called to report his coworker's workplace theft, but then re-
leased tape recordings of victim's call to the coworker, who later killed the whistle-blower);
Dykema v. Skoumal, 1999 W.L. 417360 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (noting that a special relationship ex-
isted when the police persuaded reluctant informant to go to the home of a suspected drug
dealer while the informant was intoxicated); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Stipp. 254 (D. NJ. 1990)
(finding that a special relationship exists where the state promises protection and a new identity
if informant's real identity were discovered induced victim to rely on those promises).
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quired the state to withhold the confidential information.''
While releasing confidential information may be characterized as
an affirmative action that creates a danger,' the line is hard to draw.
At least one case, Dykema v. Skoumia4's" explicitly referred to the basis
of liability as a "special relationship." Furthermore, in that case, the
police had not, strictly speaking, created the danger to the informant,
such as by revealing his identity. Rather, the police had persistently
tried to persuade him to act as an informant after he expressed his
desire to stop acting in that role, and had arranged for him to go to
the home of a suspected drug dealer while the informant was intoxi-
cated. Although the informant was technically free to refuse the as-
signment, the Illinois district court extended the special relationship
rule based on the extent of police involvement in the informant's de-
cision.
Similarly, courts have held state officials liable for failing to live up
to promises to protect specific victims from their likely attackers.
This is especially relevant in cases of domestic violence, where the po-
lice promise to hold an abusive spouse or boyfriend in custody, but
then release him to commit more violence.'4
Other cases have found special relationships in situations seem-
ingly not covered by DeShaney's narrow custody exception. For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit found that police had entered into a spe-
cial relationship with a woman when they undertook to instruct her
on how to protect herself from her estranged husband's violence."5
Another case in the Eleventh Circuit held that a residential school for
the deaf had a special relationship with its students such as to protect
them from sexual assaults by other students.'s Some circuits have
also held that compulsory school attendance laws create a situation
analogous to custody, such that schools owe a duty of care to stu-
dents.
7
151 SeeKallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998) (revealing officers' iden-
tities and personal information to defense counsel in a drug conspiracy case).
1 See Pellicciotti, supra note 115, at §11 (explaining that the Moinfiis case did not impose a
duty of protection, but rather required the state to avoid affirmatively creating a danger to the
victim).
3 1999 WL 417360 (N.D. El1. 1999).
LM See eg., Simpson v. City of Miami, 700 So. 2d 87 (Fla. App. 1997) (rel)ing on Florida stat-
ute requiring all arrested persons to be brought before ajudge as imposing a duty on police not
to release estranged husband who, after release, killed his wife). Contra Pinder v.Johnson. 5-4
F.3d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that victim's reliance upon police officer's
promise did not create a special relationship or an affirmative duty. 'By requiring a custodial
context as the condition for an affirmative duty, DeS hanf, rejected the idea that such a duty can
arise solely from an official's awareness of a specific risk or from promises of aid.').
S Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1990).
1s6 Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994).
137 See, eg., Pagano by Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schs., 714 F. Supp. 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(justifying student's request for school to protect him from classmate attacks): Stoneking v.
Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989). CoUntra Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (supporting student's rights to bodily integrity while finding that a
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2. The State-Created Danger Theory
State actors may be held liable when, through their affirmative
acts, they causally contribute to the danger that injures the plaintiff.
In such a situation, a duty arises when state actors "create a danger-
ous situation for the public and fail to take reasonable preventative
steps to diffuse that danger.""1s This rule, even in its minimalist ver-
sion, accepts state responsibility for the wrongful acts of private indi-
viduals if the state actor placed the victim in danger:
[I]f a state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and
then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role is merely
passive; it is as much an active tort-feasor as if it had thrown him into a
snake pit. 9
Building on similar language in DeShaney,"40 several circuits have held
state actors responsible even when the state's causal link to the dan-
ger must be defined in mixed terms of both negative duties to refrain
from causing harm, and positive duties to prevent harm.
The many types of state conduct that can lead to liability under
the state-created danger theory can be grouped into the following
categories: abandoning a victim to a dangerous situation; bringing a
victim into close proximity with a person the state knew was violent;
cutting off private sources of aid without providing a meaningful al-
ternative; or conspiring with private actors to permit or assist in the
commission of a wrongful act.41
These cases generally share four requirements: reasonably fore-
seeable harm; culpable state of mind; a causal nexus between the
state actor's omission and the injury; and, in some circuits, that the
victim be a known or foreseeable individual. 42 However, some cases
in which the state actors' omissions facilitate the crime, and in which
the results were sufficiently egregious, courts have held the state re-
sponsible despite the fact that the victim or the type of harm were not
directly foreseeable.
43
The Third Circuit's state-created danger test is illustrative. The
test articulates the exception to DeShaney further than the earlier
cases to include a state-of-mind inquiry:
school official's liability arises only when official exhibits indifference to student's rights).
138 Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122,1127 (7th Cir. 1993).
159 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (PosnerJ.).
140 SeeDeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) ("While
the State may have been aware of the dangers thatJoshua faced in the free world, it played no
part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.").
141 See Pellicciotti, supra note 115, at 50 (grouping successful state-created danger claims into
categores based on the facts involved).
-See Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 152-53 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277
(1980)); id. at 152 n.224 (discussing circuit split on the issue of foreseeable victims).
13 See id. at 154 (citing White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979)); id. at 153 (citing
Nishiyama v. Dickson County, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987)).
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[C]ases predicating constitutional liability on a suite-created danger the-
ory have four common elements:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct: (2) the
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of tie plaintiff: (3)
there existed some relationship between the suite and the plaintiff; (4)
the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity that other-
wise would not have existed for the third party's crime to occur.
It is worth noting that the "prior relationship" means only that the
individual was a "foreseeable victim," not that the state took him into
custody.'
6
The Tenth Circuit set fonard a similar test in Uhirig v. Harder."
Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) [he] was a member of a limited and
specifically definable group; (2) defendants' conduct put [him] ... at
substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (3) the risk
was obvious or known; (4) Defendants acted recklessly in conscious dis-
regard of that risk- and (5) such conduct, when viewed in total, is con-
science shocking.
1
The Tenth Circuit later added a sixth requirement, that "the
charged state entity... created the danger or increased the plaintiffs
vulnerability to the danger in some way.
Some state-created danger cases have recognized the special help-
lessness of certain victims, despite the Court's implied reasoning in
DeShaney that individuals in the "free world" should be left to fend for
themselves.14 Analogous to the rule in Youngberg and Estelle cases in-
volving involuntary confinement by the state, lower courts have rec-
ognized that the government may cut off self-help or outside assis-
tance even when there is no involuntary confinement or custody.o
This rule parallels the tort doctrine that holds individuals liable for
interfering with a rescue.''
3. Hann Directly Caused by a Stale Actor
Cases in which a state agency has been found liable for injuries
caused by another state actor contain elements of both misfeasance
4 See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Mark v. Borough of Hat-
boro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995)).
145 i at 1209.
146 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).
147 It at 572.
14S Chavez v. Wagon Mound Public Schs., 159 F.3d 12953, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998).
149 SeeDeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Sem., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) ("'While
the State may have been aware of the dangers thatJoshua faced in the free world, it played no
part in their creation...."); Soifer, supra note 45, at 1519-20 ("Because no government had
locked upJoshua, he ought to have taken care of himself. That is what individuals, rugged or
not, are expected to do in the free world.").
150 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 147-49 (discussing cases arising ithin a few years after
DeShaney in which the state restricts private assistance).
1 RESrATFMNT (SECOND) OFToRTs §§ 326,327 (1965).
Apr. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
and nonfeasance. State agencies have been held responsible for con-
stitutional rights violations resulting from such arguably non-active
conduct as improper training, supervision, or lack of needed de-
partmental policy-making. 52 In addition, state employees such as po-
lice officers and prison officials have been held liable for failing to
protect a victim from the wrongdoing of a fellow officer.'
4. Cases Denying Liability: DeShaney's Legacy
Equally instructive are the cases that seem to fit within the state-
created danger theory or other exceptions, but where the state actors
in question are nonetheless held not liable as a result of DeShaney and
similar precedents. Cases denying a state-created danger theory or
other liability for abusive inaction strike the reader as more anoma-
lous and stilted in their reasoning than the opinions that attempt to
carve an exception out of DeShaney's broad language. Such cases oc-
cur just as often, if not more often, than cases that are held to fall
under an exception to DeShaney.
One notable example is Pinder v. Johnson. In that case, Carol
Pinder's abusive ex-boyfriend, Don Pittman, broke into her house
and began attacking and threatening her and her children. ' Ms.
Pinder relied on a police officer's promise that Pittman would be
held at least overnight, and that it would be safe for her to return to
work that night. However, the police later released Pittman, who re-
turned to the Pinder home and set it on fire, killing Ms. Pinder's
three children.'5
The first time this case came before the Fourth Circuit, the court
found that Officer Johnson's promise had created a "special relation-
ship" sufficient to expose him to liability under the state-created dan-
157ger exception. However, on en banc review, the Fourth Circuit re-
versed itself to hold that Officer Johnson had no duty to follow
through on his promises.
The court's rationale for its en banc decision is even more stilted
than the reasoning of DeShaney.
There was no custodial relationship with the plaintiffs in this case. Nei-
therJohnson nor any other state official had restrained Pinder's freedom
to act on her own behalf. Pinder was never incarcerated, arrested, or
otherwise restricted in any way. Without any such limitation imposed on
her liberty, DeShaney indicates Pinder was due no affirmative constitu-
152 Eaton & Wells, supra note 39, at 150-52.
153 See id. at 151-52 (noting that such holding is not based on vicarious liability, but on the
premise that inaction can violate someone's constitutional rights).
:54 33 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 1994), reu'd54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
155 Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1172.
156 &
157 Pinder, 33 F.3d at 371.
158 Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1169.
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tional duty of protection from the state, and Johnson would not be
charged with liability for the criminal acts of a third party.IA
Under any reasonable reading of the facts, this case should fit
nicely within any test for state-created danger. the harm %%as rea-
sonably foreseeable (Pittman had threatened Pinder and had previ-
ously been arrested for attempted arson against her home); the vic-
tims were easily foreseeable; Officer Johnson acted with reckless
disregard for the safety of Pinder and her children; and the act would
likely not have occurred had Ms. Pinder not relied upon Johnson's
representations. However, the Fourth Circuit seems to have chosen a
mechanical application of DeShane,'s broad negative rights rule
rather than to have sought to do justice in Pinder. This decision
poignantly illustrates the injustice worked by the sweeping negative
rights rule of DeShaney.
Another case similarly emphasized the fact that the victim was not
confined by the state when she was attacked as a result of a govern-
ment actor's negligence or indifference. In Liebson v. Newl Mexico Cor-
rections Departmenti, a librarian was kidnapped, held hostage, and
sexually assaulted by a prison inmate. Although previously a correc-
tions officer had been posted in the library, five days before the at-
tack the guard's schedule was changed, so there was no guard on
duty in the library at the time of the attack. The Tenth Circuit read
DeShaney broadly and the exceptions to DeShane, narrowly to preclude
liability under either the special relationship exception or the state-
created danger exception. ' In that court's reasoning, because Ms.
Liebson was free to leave her job and was not otherwise confined by
the state, the prison could not be held liable for its negligence.'
The court seemed to go out of its way to avoid declaring a duty on the
part of the prison to ensure safe working conditions for Ms. lieb-
son-who, incidentally, was not a prison employee, but uras employed
by a local community college and was assigned to the prison library
temporarily.'3 Instead of requiring the prison to simply provide safe
working conditions for its employees, the Tenth Circuit framed the
discussion, in effect, as if Ms. Liebson had assumed the risk of inmate
attacks when she did not quit her job.' This type of reasoning,
which sounds absurd to anyone who has ever worked for a living, is
only made necessary by sweeping negative-rights rulings such as De-
Shaney, no inherent logic or principles of law require it.
M Id. at 1175.
360 73 F.3d 274 (10th Cir. 1996).
161 Id. at 276 (internal citations omitted).
2 Id. at 278.
163 Id. at275.
ICA Liebson, 73 F.3d at 276.
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C. Positive Rights in State Constitutions
To some extent, the negative rights view continues to influence
state constitutional law. Eighteen state constitutions explicitly man-
date government assistance for the poor,'o and all fifty state constitu-
tions contain at least the positive right to education. ' However,
some state courts have followed the federal negative-rights model ef-
fectively ignoring or eviscerating their states' positive rights guaran-
tees. Other state courts have given these positive rights varying de-
grees of force. State courts that fail to give full effect to positive rights
in state constitutions rely on federal norms and precedents that some
commentators consider inapgropriate, given the unique history and
nature of state constitutions. , Relying on a separation of powers ra-
tionale, the highest courts of New York, Idaho, and Colorado have
maintained almost complete deference to the state legislatures' dis-
cretion on how to enact certain positive rights guarantees'6a Other
state courts-especially Illinois, Kansas, and Montana-have applied
a deferential approach in particular cases without closing the door
altogether to some rights to government assistance under the states'
constitutions. 69
Many of the justifications for limiting positive rights in federal
constitutional law rely on uniquely federal concerns that should not
be carried over into state constitutional law, such as federalism, sepa-
ration of powers, and restraint of the Supreme Court's power."o For
instance, as Professor Hershkoff has described, many states' review of
welfare legislation mirrors federal rational basis review.' However,
the main policy considerations behind the federal courts' deference
to Congress and state legislatures do not hold true when dealing with
state constitutional rights. For example, separation of powers con-
cerns-especially a perceived need to restrain the power of the courts
and to prevent them from making policy judgments-are a key mo-
tive behind judicial deference. '7 Unlike federal courts, however,
a SeeJonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: 7The
Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1076 & n.100 (1993)
(listing the relevant sections from state constitutions).
16 Id. at 1076.
167 See Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution, supra note 80, at 67 (discussing the influence of federal
welfare law); Feldman, supra note 165, at 1062-63 (discussing the influence of federal separation
of powers doctrine); Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 102, at 1153-69 (discussing the influ-
ence of federal rational basis review).
:16 See Feldman, supra note 165, at 1078-83 (discussing leading cases in those states).
69 Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, Let Them Starve: Government's Obligation to Children in
Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1607, 1626-28 (1995). After the Montana Supreme Court used a state
constitutional provision guaranteeing economic and social assistance to strike down a welfare
funding scheme, the state legislature amended the constitution so that the "right" is now
phrased as a discretionary function. Id. at 1627-28.10 Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 102, at 1154.
71 Id. at 1153.
in See id. at 1153-55 (discussing federal rationality review).
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many state courts are popularly controlled, or at the very least, the lo-
cal or state political system allows for greater control and accountabil-
ity.173 Also, state court decisions do not have the finality of United
States Supreme Court decisions. ' Additionally, state courts are not
strictly separated from the other branches of government; instead,
they work interdependently with state governments and are often in-
volved in political issues.'m In fact, positive rights guarantees in state
constitutions give state courts the unique task of interpreting and en-
forcing those substantive commands and making sure that state laws
uphold the meaning of those rights.1
76
Despite the influence of the negative rights view, man), state
courts have actively enforced positive state constitutional rights and
have even generated unique bodies of law pertaining to those
rights.1' One basic development is that state courts engage in "con-
sequential" review: Unlike federal heightened scrutiny review, which
evaluates how a law burdens a constitutional right, consequential re-
view asks whether a state law helps or hinders a constitutionally man-
dated rightYm
Examining state constitutional decisions yields two results. First,
these decisions demonstrate the need to end the hegemony of the
negative rights theory. The pervasiveness of the negative rights view,
even in the face of contradictory constitutional mandates, shows that
this theory has overstepped its boundaries and has crippled state con-
stitutional doctrine. Second, the cases in which state courts have up-
held claims for positive rights are enlightening as to the effects and
enforceability of those decisions. The rights themselves are usually
phrased as goals, instructing the state legislature to use its discretion
and its power to achieve those goals.'9 Contrary to the worries of
negative-rights advocates, state courts have been successful in enforc-
ing claims for positive state action.'8a
III. PoucY ARGUMEN TS
In addition to widening the gap between law and ethics and inter-
fering with the natural evolution of the law, the negative rights view
17 See iU. at 1170 (distinguishing state courts from federal courts and noting that state
judges are often popularly elected).
See id at 1162 (discussing how state legislatures can ovrrule state court decisions much
more easily than Congress can overrule the Supreme Court).
1 See id. at 1156-57 ("'State courts settle contests over public offices, pass on the propriety of
proposed public expenditures and even of proposed constitutional amendments, often at the
suit of mere 'taxpayers."") (quoting former Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme
Court)).
76 Id. at 1154, 1169-70.
177 Hershkoff, Positive Rights supra note 102, at 1183.
"7 Id. at 1184.
179 Hershkoff, WllfareDevolulion, supra note 80. at 1413-15.
180 d.
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claims to advance some policy objectives at the cost of other, more
important goals. Policy arguments make up the bulk of the literature
supporting the negative rights view and, in many cases, are more con-
vincing than any moral or legal arguments. A critical examination of
these policy concerns sheds light on the weakness of their predic-
tions, highlights the benefits of including positive rights in the law,
and instructs judges and legislators on how to most effectively struc-
ture a plan for realizing positive rights.
A. Policy Arguments from the Negative Rights View
Supporters of the negative rights view usually conjure up images
of judicial chaos or government overreaching in order to dismiss
even modest claims for positive rights. Their policy arguments and
predictions fall into three general groups: difficulties of enforce-
ment; negative economic or incentivizing effects; and structural or
slippery slope problems. At the outset, it is important to note that
these policy arguments only affect the practical feasibility affirmative
duties and how they should be elaborated and implemented; they do
not address the question whether such a right exists at all.''
1. Judicial competence, difficulties of enforcement
The negative rights view claims that positive rights are not suited
to our system of adjudication. For one thing, it would be difficult to
establish causation in a failure-to-act case.8 2 Also, the question of re-
sponsibility is complicated by the lack of reciprocity in affirmative du-
ties: While negative rights imply obvious reciprocal duties, i.e., for
each person not to harm the other, positive rights do not generate
these clear reciprocal obligations: No one identifiable individual (or,
by extension, government actor) is required to fulfill a person's
needs.'8
There is also the fear that recognizing positive rights, especially
those as broad as a general right to subsistence, would overwhelm the
courts with disruptive cases. The problems arise because such a right
may be inchoate, lack a firm textual basis, not indicate clear stan-
dards for decision-making, and may take an uncertain course of de-
velopment.""
Finally, because many positive rights are legally imprecise, they
require legislative and executive definition before they can be effec-
tively protected.'8 However, judges are ill-equipped to "create" and
:81 Tribe, supra note 91, at 342.
182 Bandes, supra note 2, at 2335-36.
k2% IL at 2337-38; Epstein, supra note 33, at 210.
:84 Dorin, supra note 70, at 556-60.
s See Currie, supra note 34, at 889 (discussing other countries' effectuation of positive con-
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define the scope of positive rights. Wlien judges attempt to define
those rights, they must decide between two sets of equally convincing
theoretical arguments; without guidance from precedent or text,
judges would be unable to make these decisions except by deciding
according to their own subjective beliefs.' s
2. Economic effiwiency and perverse incentives
Several law-and-economics type arguments claim that recognizing
positive rights would skew people's incentives toward socially or eco-
nomically undesirable behavior. For example, in the context of duty-
to-rescue or duty-to-report laws, some commentators have expressed
concern that such laws might actually discourage the reporting of
crimes in some instances. Eugene Volokh described how such laws
disincentivize "delayed Samaritans" (who initially do not report a
crime, but later change their minds) and "passive Samaritans" (who
do not report the crime until the police come to them) from report-
ing crimes. Because these individuals would be subject to civil or
criminal liability for their initial delay, they may choose not to coo1
erate at all instead of offering their (albeit limited) cooperation.
Analogously, when government is deemed to owe a positive duty to-
ward its citizens and can be sued for doing a bad job, those agencies
or officers who provide the services at issue will avoid those responsi-
bilities altogether.
Those who oppose claims for positive rights observe that negative
rights can be enforced fairly cheaply: "In principle, all persons can
comply with the commands of the law, wholly without regard to their
initial wealth or natural endowments."'8' In contrast, positive rights
can generate high enforcement costs because the), require positive
action plus enforcement of a duty to act when it is not always clear
when that duty has been breachedH 9
3. Slippery slope and structural concerns
Critics of positive rights claims assert that, once we recognize af-
firmative governmental duties in some cases, we will be forced to ex-
tend them to others, creating havoc for lawmakers and administrators
and depleting the state treasury. This argument claims that even a
narrowly tailored positive right-say, the right to state protection to a
known individual when an appropriate state agency is already in
stitutional rights).
2s6 See Robert H. Bork, Commentary, The Impossibility of Fnding Wdfare Rights in the Constitu-
tion, 1979 WASH. U. LQ. 695,700 (1979).
1s7 Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperatit'e iffrtis of Law 88 GEO. UJ. 105
(1999).
:8 Epstein, supra note 33, at 208.
9 Id. at 208-09.
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place-could be expanded in later cases, eventually leading the
courts to require the creation of new agencies to provide other serv-
ices.' 90
Furthermore, critics assert that judicial enforcement would upset
the balance of powers between the branches of government. This ar-
gument starts from the premise that our government is structured
such that the legislative and executive branches formulate general
policies, and the courts fill in the gaps in those policies.'9 ' Negative
rights advocates fear that courts will intrude on legislative discretion
regarding spending priorities, or that they may order legislatures to
create new services to fulfill positive rights'92 Such action would ig-
nore the fact that the government has only limited resources with
which to satisfy numerous claims and interests.'93 Furthermore, be-
cause such judicial management would require reordering funda-
mental interests and priorities, positive rights would lead to conflict
and controversy.194
The negative rights view is also attractive to those concerned
about the effect of positive rights claims on federalism. According to
this argument, once a federal court declares any positive rights, it
would assume the power to force states to fulfill those rights. The
courts would become too involved in managing state governments,
telling the states which agencies or systems would be responsible for
carrying out which obligations.'9 5
Likewise, judicial enforcement would encroach on agency discre-
tion, perhaps to the detriment of the individuals served by those
agencies. When cases implicating positive rights to agency action
arise, the courts will have to examine the actions of administrators
and state employees, as well as the allocation of funds within the
agency, to determine whether a breach of duty occurred.'96 At some
point, this scrutiny of agency actions would amount to judicial man-
agement of those agencies.
C. Policy Arguments from the Positive Rights View
The policy concerns posed by the advocates of the negative rights
view are merely hypothetical; because the federal judiciary has not
190 See id. at 230-32 (summarizing slippery slope arguments from various sources).
19" See Dorin, supra note 70, at 556 (arguing that judicial policymaking amounts to judicial
legislation).
- See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 1237-38; Eaton & wells, supra note 39, at 128-29 (discussing
government discretion principles).
See Epstein, supra note 33, at 207 ("No legal or political theory of rights is acceptable if it
fails to generate rights and duties consistent with the limited resources that must be generated
to satisfy them.").
:9 Schwartz, supra note 76, at 1237.
195 See Dorin, supra note 70, at 557 (criticizing the impact of court-declared positive rights on
federalism).
1% See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2327 (discussing the arguments against positive rights).
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opened the door to significant positive rights claims, none of these
predicted problems have been observed. To the contrary, the expe-
riences of state courts and of foreign countries in enforcing constitu-
tional positive rights guarantees have shown that reasonable, effective
standards for dealing with these claims are possible.'9 In addition,
advocates of positive rights generally claim three types of benefits to
including this conception of rights in constitutional law: the judici-
ary's role in shaping the law through its interactions with legislatures;
controlling and preventing administrative failures; and providing a
remedy to the victims of callous government neglect
1. Judicial dialogue with legislatures as an impetus for legal evolution
Positive rights advocates point out, first, that positive rights have
been proven judicially enforceable. American courts can already
mandate the public expenditure of funds or the supervision of
agency policies and have done so with considerable success-for in-
stance, by implementing school desegregation.'53 State courts have
also successfully enforced explicit guarantees of positive rights con-
tained in state constitutions.
Secondly, even if courts are incapable of enforcing a particular
right, the fact that they are willing to recognize that right is important
in establishing that the right exists, so the legislature should take it
into consideration when balancing other obligations and priorities."
Although some positive social rights may not be strictly enforceable,
they are no different in this respect than many accepted civil rights.
Some rights are purely formal; that is, they require only recognition
by the government and an attempt to effectuate them, but they do
not require that such efforts be completely successful.' Rather than
a win-or-lose model of enforcement, as we now have with negative
rights, formal positive rights' success can be measured by each indi-
vidual helped. For example, although America may never have won
the "war on poverty," Johnson's "Great Society" programs were very
effective at improving the lives of poor people; therefore, they effec-
tively (albeit imperfectly) fulfilled a duty to help the poor.'
197 See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, sup note 102, at 1153-69 (discussing state constitutions):
Mary Ann Glendon, Righls in Tweniieth-Ceniur, Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L REV. 519 (1992) (dis-
cussing guarantees of social rights in other countries' constitutions).
1 Schwartz, supra note 76, at 1238.
199 Hershkoff, WdfareDevolution, supra note 80, at 1410-15.
Schwartz, supra note 76, at 1240.
-0 Tushnet, supra note 79, at 1214-15.
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 530. The rhetoric of a wNar on poverty" may have contrib-
uted to the fall in popularity of social programs after the 1960's. IUt A "rar requires a %inner
and a loser, anything less than complete victory is seen as a loss. Id. However, from the per-
spective of the individuals helped by the Great Society programs, this counuys efforts to ame-
liorate the hardships of poverty were to a great degree successful. I.
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While generally held values and ethics inform the law, likewise the
law can serve to influence social norms. Some opponents of positive
rights claim that active judicial enforcement of those rights, in over-
riding the democratic process, would generate hostility toward posi-
tive rights among the public. However, it is more likely thatjudicial
or legislative recognition of positive rights will in turn strengthen the
public's appreciation of those rights. 04
2. Correcting administrative failures
Under the negative rights rule, state agencies have a stronger in-
centive not to act, and thus avoid liability, than to take action and risk
201liability for malfeasance. When judicial supervision of an agency is
activated as a result of a positive rights claim, the potential exists to
increase accountability within agencies. As Professor Beerman points
out, information gaps between politicians and the electorate, as well
as misplaced incentives within agency structures, can lead agencies to
pursue policies that do not reflect the majority's preferences. Judi-
cial intervention would increase accountability between administra-
tors and politicians, and between politicians and the electorate.""
Moreover, even though the deterrent effect of damages awards on
state actors is uncertain,2' direct judicial enforcement of a positive
right through injunctive relief is always available to correct adminis-
trative failures.
3. Providing a remedy against abusive government inaction
The most important policy goal of recognizing positive rights in
' Maggs, supra note 56, at 1045.
" See Ackerman, supra note 85, at 662 ("The tendency on the part of the public to equate
law with morality, to assume that if something is not illegal then it is not immoral, may suggest
the practical need for a rule requiring rescue in situations in which the potential rescuer is notin geril.").
- See Bandes, supra note 2, at 2284, 2284 n.65 (citing PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT
59-87 (1983)).
206 See Beerman, supra note 14, at 1104-1108 (discussing gaps in the chain of responsibility
between agencies, politicians, and the electorate).= Id. at 1106-08. Beerman demonstrates that judicial remedies could increase accountability
in a number of ways. For example, incumbents often set goals for a social program in order to
gain publicity, but because the electorate does not hear about funding decisions, these agencies
end up inadequately funded. Courts could provide a remedy to those injured by this neglect,
thus forcing politicians to either live up to their promises or suffer the costs on election day. Id.
at 1107. In cases involving agencies that fail to pursue the policies set by statutes or political
leadership, the fear of lawsuits could create incentives for administrators to perform their jobs
properly, and lawsuits would alert the people and their representatives to problems within the
agencies. Id.
20 See DarylJ. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitu-
tional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000) (discussing the uncertain incentivizing effects of con-
stitutional damage awards).
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the Constitution is, quite simply, justice. The courts must abandon
the negative rights rhetoric in order to provide a remedy to victims of
administrative malfeasance or neglect. As Justice Brennan stated in
his dissenting opinion in DeShaney, "inaction can be every bit as abu-
sive of power as action... oppression can result when a State under-
takes a vital duty and then ignores it."M30 The DeShanze, decision ig-
nores the need for compassion in adjudication: "[a] crucial lesson of
our bleak century, and of the Holocaust in particular, is that it can be
morally reprehensible to do nothing in the face of evil."" Soifer
points out that the Justices had an opportunity, with the DeShaney
case, to correct the injustice of administrative neglect, but instead
they retreated into formalistic rationalizing and line-drawing, ignor-
ing the real human problems at hand.2 12 That is why, on a basic, vis-
ceral level, the DeShaney decision offends so man), people's sense of
basic fairness and justice.
CONCLUSION
The strict negative rights view is a type of legal fiction: It is an arti-
ficial structure, only loosely based on ethical and historical traditions,
set up purely for the sake of convenience. This fiction, however, has
done more harm than good. It contradicts this country's legal and
political culture, it has warped the evolution of the law, and it has led
to formalistic decisions like Pinder that make a mocker), of our ideals
of justice. The distortions caused by this doctrine are serious: Not
only may the state stand idly by and refuse to fulfill its promises of
help to its citizens, as the Department of Human Services did in De-
Shaney, but it may actually burden or discriminate against fundamen-
tal rights by refusing to fund or protect those rights, as in the abor-
tion funding cases. A semantic flick of the wrist transforms
government neglect of civil rights into "blameless" inaction. 235
Moreover, the Court's "greater includes the lesser" reasoning used in
DeShaney and other cases seems to defy the principles of equal pro-
tection as well as common sense: "the Equal Protection clause could
theoretically be satisfied by denying education to all children or by
SeegenerallyJOHN RAWIS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE (1999) (stating thatjustice is the first irtue
of any public institution).
-10 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Sen's., 489 U.S. 189. 211 (1989) (Brennan.
J., dissenting).
Soifer, supra note 45, at 1531.
212 Id. at 1531-32.
213 See Bandes, supra note 2, passim (explaining how the Court relies on several tricky seman-
tic differences that hold little meaning on their own: private/public, action/inaction, pen-
alty/subsidy, etc.).
SeeSoifer, supra note 45, at 1521 (discussing this argument in DrShanw); see also i. at 1518
(noting that the Court's logic presupposes as fact that there are no positive righi s contained in
the Constitution; it cannot serve to prove that very fact).
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allocating to each student equal shares of substandard schooling.21 1'
In addition, the negative rights view has corrupted the law's evolu-
tion in the states and in federal constitutional law. Even though most
states' constitutions explicitly require the government to fulfill some
positive rights, the negative rights view imported from federal consti-
tutional law has corrupted those states' jurisprudence. In addition,
lower federal courts have been forced to either find ways around De-
Shaney-which indicate a general dissatisfaction with that case's broad
holding-or else to abandon considerations of justice and rightness
in favor of a twisted form of logic that inevitably erases the govern-
ment from the picture, no matter how deep its real involvement in a
situation.' 6
Nevertheless, hidden beneath the negative rights view's "ideologi-
cal barrier"217 is a philosophical and cultural landscape that is ripe for
the growth of various positive constitutional rights. The DeShaney ma-
jority's definition of rights, and which rights belong in the Constitu-
tion, is far from absolute. Professor Tushnet had aptly demonstrated
that the concepts of civil versus social rights, as well as the definitions
of those rights, change over time. 8 The experience of state courts, as
well as the exceptions to the DeShaney rule, indicate that positive
rights are indeed enforceable without unduly disrupting legislative
discretion or separation of powers. Where the public interest out-
weighs the practical difficulties, allowing positive rights claims can
bring jurisprudence back into line with people's ethical expectations
of their government. Such a change would redirect constitutional ju-
risprudence toward a more intellectually rich and ethicallyjust path.
Cases like Joshua DeShaney's are all too common in an age of
budget cuts and welfare reform. The negative rights theory encour-
ages administrative neglect by relieving state actors of responsibility
for their actions and by suppressing open judicial consideration of
various legitimate theories. Some courts have already shown that
they are not content to toe the line DeShaney has drawn. These ex-
ceptions, as well as the development of a duty to rescue in tort law,
reflect our culture's evolving moral standards. Judges and legislators
would be wise to consider the benefits of accepting positive rights as
an important part of our Constitution. Only then will our basic con-
stitutional freedoms have any real meaning to innocent victims like
Joshua.
-1 Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S. Constitution:
A Beinningto theEnd of the National Education Crisi 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550,574 n.147 (1992).
See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 208-10 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the DeShaney majority downplays the extent of the
state's prior involvement in Joshua's life in order to bolster its claim of inaction); Soifer, supra
note 45, at 1517.
-17 Tushnet, supra note 79, at 1392.
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